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PROXY REGULATION: ENSURING
ACCURATE DISCLOSURE THROUGH
A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
Scienter, the "hobgoblin of common law deceit,"' has become a
household word for those involved in securities regulation.2 The
question haunting both courts and practitioners is which sections of
the securities acts require scienter and which do not.3 The answer to
this question is crucial to the determination of the scope of liability
and protection afforded by each provision of the securities laws.
4
The watershed of the scienter issue was reached in the Supreme
Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.S The Court in Hoch-
felder held that an implied private cause of action for damages under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 8
and rule lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), 7 could only be maintained if the actionable conduct was per-
formed with scienter. The Court defined scienter as "the intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Hence, conduct that is merely
the result of negligence does not constitute scienter.' 0
1. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1729 (2d ed. 1961).
2. See Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. Law. 789, 789-90
(1978); Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63
Minn. L. Rev. 79, 79-86 (1978); Note, Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter
Standard After Hochfelder, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 817, 818-22 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Recklessness]; Note, New Light on an Old Debate: Negligence v. Scienter in
an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 759, 760-61 (1977): 12 St. Mary's
L.J. 754, 759-62 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter required under § 17
(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (1976)); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976)); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-30 (scienter required under § 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980);
Vernava, Responsibility of the Accountant Under the Federal Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 6 J. Corp. L. 317, 327-35 (1981) (ramifications of Hochfelder decision
on scienter issue).
4. Note, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: Narrowing the Scope of Accountants'
Professional Liability Under the Securities Laws, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 683, 683 (1977);
12 St. Mary's L.J. 754, 765-66 (1981).
5. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
8. 425 U.S. at 193.
9. Id. at 194 & n.12.
10. Id. at 214. Scienter traditionally has been defined as an intent to mislead or
deceive by the transmission of a false statement. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of
Torts § 107, at 700-01 (4th ed. 1971). The Supreme Court redefined scienter as the
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One question expressly left open by the Hochfelder Court is
whether scienter is required in an implied private action for damages
under the provision of the 1934 Act governing misstatements or omis-
sions in proxy statements," section 14(a)' 2 and rule 14a-9 promul-
gated thereunder. 1 3 This issue, although noted by the Supreme Court
in a later decision,' 4 has never been decided.' 5 While the majority of
the federal appellate courts have indicated that they favor a negli-
gence standard,' 6 at least one circuit has held that a showing of
scienter is necessary under the proxy rules. '7
This note analyzes the proxy provisions in an effort to determine the
proper standard of culpability. Part I discusses the background of the
proxy provisions and the elements of a cause of action under section
14(a). Utilizing the Hochfelder statutory construction analysis, Part II
concludes that the proper standard of culpability under the proxy
provisions should be one of negligence. Part III demonstrates that this
conclusion is consistent with the important disclosure policies underly-
ing the proxy rules and commensurate with the obligations of the
various participants in a proxy solicitation.
intent to manipulate or deceive, but expressly left open the question whether reckless-
ness would constitute scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 &
n.12 (1976). Courts after Hochfelder have held that recklessness is sufficient for a
showing of scienter. G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th
Cir. 1981); SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 624 F.2d 1312, 1321 & n.17 (5th
Cir. 1980); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980), aff-'d en
banc, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 506 (1981), SEC v. Cenco
Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 200 (N.D. Ill. 1977); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp.
1057, 1080-82 (D. Del. 1976); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See generally Recklessness, supra note 2.
11. 425 U.S. at 209 n.28.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
14. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444-45 n.7 (1976); see Bertoglio
v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 651-52 (D. Del. 1980).
15. Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1403 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 651-52
(D. Del. 1980); Note, The Proper Standard of Fault for Imposing Personal Liability
on Corporate Directors for False or Misleading Statements in Proxy Solicitations
Under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-9, 34
Ohio St. L.J. 670, 676-77 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proper Standard]; Note,
Liability of Accountants for Proxy Violations- The Appropriate Standard of Culpa-
bility, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 743, 745 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Liability].
16. See, e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d
Cir. 1976); Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1403 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-
01 (2d Cir. 1973); Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 651-52 (D. Del. 1980); Berman v.
Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F.
Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
17. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
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I. THE PROXY PROVISIONS
The use of proxies18 has become a practical necessity in modern
corporate life.' Shareholders in publicly held corporations are geo-
graphically dispersed throughout the country and thus are usually
unable to attend a stockholder meeting. 0 As a result, "'[a] sharehold-
ers' meeting [has become] a kind of ancient, meaningless ritual."' 2 1
Corporate decisions requiring shareholder approval, therefore, must
be accomplished by proxy.
22
In order to make absentee voting a viable organizational tool,
information disseminated by proxy must fully and accurately disclose
the facts upon which a shareholder will base his voting decision..
2 3 To
ensure the free flow of honest, reliable information to shareholders,
2 4
18. "The proxy relationship is commonly defined as the agency created when a
corporate shareholder authorizes the proxy holder to represent him at the shareholder
meeting by casting the votes to which the shareholder is entitled by virtue of his stock
ownership." Comment, Proxy Solicitations: The Need for Expanded Disclosure Re-
quirements, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 1100, 1101 (1977). Under the securities laws, the word
proxy is a term of art and includes every "proxy, consent, or authorization." 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-l(d) (1981); see 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud &
Commodities Fraud § 6.5(321), at 136.21 (1981); 2 L. Loss, s'upra note 1, at 871.
19. W. Carey & M. Eisenberg, Cases and Materials on Corporations 277 (5th ed.
1980); Aranow & Einhorn, Proxy Regulation: Suggested Improvemients, 28 GCeo.
Wash. L. Rev. 306, 306 (1959); Brey, A Synopsis of the Proxy Rules of the Securities
& Exchange Commission, 26 U. Cin. L. Rev. 58, 58 (1957): Comment, Shareholder
Democracy: A Description and Critical Analysis of the Proxy System. 60 N.C. L.
Rev. 145, 146 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Shareholder Democracy].
20. Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 19, at 306; Brey, supra note 19, at 58;
Shareholder Democracy, supra note 19, at 146; see 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 857-58.
21. 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 869 n.35 (quoting A. Berle, Economic Power and
the Free Society 7 (1958)).
22. 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 857-58; Note, SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.:
Imposing a Stringent Duty of Care on Corporate Board Nominees Under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 468, 469 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Board Nominees].
23. Shareholder Democracy, supra note 19, at 153; Board Nominees, supra note
22, at 469.
24. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); 2 L. Loss, supra note 1,
at 857-58; Comment, Shareholders' Remedies for Violation of Proxy Rule 14a-9, 31
Sw. L. J. 1125, 1125 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Shareholders" Remedies]; Comment,
Private Actions and the Proxy Rules: The Basis and the Breadth of the Federal
Remedy, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 328, 333-34 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Private Actions];
Note, Causation and Liability in Private Actions for Proxy Violations, 80 Yale L.J.
107, 122 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Causation & Liability]; Board Nominees, supra
note 22, at 469. Section 14(a) was enacted "in order that the stockholder may have
adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his interests are being served, it is
essential that he be enlightened not only as to the financial condition of the corpora-
tion, but also as to the major questions of policy which are decided at stockholders
meetings. Too often proxies are solicited without explanations to the stockholders of
the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast their vote is sought." S.
Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2 Sess. 12 (1934).
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Congress enacted section 14(a) of the 1934 Act to deal specifically with
proxy materials. 25  Section 14(a) makes it unlawful to issue proxy
materials in violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by the
SEC.2 6  Pursuant to this broad rule-making authority,2 7 the SEC
formulated rule 14a-9, which forbids the use of proxies containing
false and misleading statements of fact, or omissions of fact, material
to a shareholder's voting decision .21
Section 14a was not designed to function as a prohibitory section, 2
but rather to shed the "white light of publicity" on corporate transac-
tions.30  The focus of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 is to place upon
those seeking shareholder consent the responsibility for any misrepre-
sentations. 31 Only secondarily are they meant to deter self-dealing
and fraudulent practices by management.32  Section 14(a) and rule
14a-9 are thus essential tools used by the SEC for ensuring corporate
disclosure3 3 and have "probably had a more beneficial effect on 'cor-
porate democracy' . . . than any other of the numerous weapons in
the SEC arsenal." 3 4
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). The proxy rules also make it unlawful for a
member of a national securities exchange or any broker to give or refrain from giving
a proxy in violation of SEC rules. Id. § 78n(b). In addition, even if a proxy is not
solicited, prior to an annual meeting, a shareholder must be provided with all the
necessary information that would have been provided had a proxy been solicited. Id.
§ 78n(c). The proxy rules also cover tender offers and offers to make a tender offer,
id. § 78n(d), and contain a prohibition against the use of fraud in a tender offer. Id. §
78n(e).
26. Id. § 78n(a). See infra note 70 for the text of section 14(a).
27. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); W.
Painter, The Federal Securities Code and Corporate Disclosure § 9.01, at 357 (1979);
K. Skousen, An Introduction to the SEC 25-26 (2d ed. 1980); Aranow & Einhorn,
supra note 19, at 307; Note, Securities Law-Misleading Proxy Statements-Outside
Accountants Can be Held Liable Under Rule 14a-9 Only Upon a Showing of Scien-
ter, 56 Notre Dame Law. 579, 582 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Misleading Proxy];
Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 469.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1981).
29. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); see 2
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 7.6(121), at 134.7. The basic purpose
of the proxy provisions is informed corporate suffrage. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 510 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
30. 78 Cong. Rec. 7925 (statement of Rep. Chapman), quoted in Causation &
Liability, supra note 24, at 122; accord Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
381-83 (1970); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); Private Actions,
supra note 24, at 333. By compelling disclosure, § 14(a) was intended to "control the
conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of
stockholders." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934).
31. Causation & Liability, supra note 24, at 121-23.
32. 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 6.5(121), at 134.7.
33. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1964); K. Skousen, supra note
27, at 25; Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 469; Proper Standard, supra note 15, at
670-71; see H. Bloomenthal, Securities Law in Perspective 117 (1977).
34. 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 866.
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The proxy provisions apply to any security that is either listed on a
national exchange, or traded over-the-counter if the issuer has 500 or
more shareholders of record and a million dollars or more in total
assets. 35 Section 14(a) applies to "any person [who] solicit[s] or [per-
mits] the use of his name to solicit any proxy"; 36 therefore, liability
may be imposed on a corporation, 37 directors, 38 outside directors, 39
board nominees, 40 and accountants. 4'
The three major elements that a plaintiff must prove in a private
action under section 14(a) are: (1) that the proxy materials contained
a false or misleading statement of a material fact; 42 (2) that the proxy
solicitation was an essential link in effecting the proposed corporate
transaction; 43 and (3) that the defendant acted with some level of
35. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976); see 2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note
18, § 6.5(311), at 135.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
37. E.g., Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 887 (1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973);
Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
38. E.g., Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Berkman v.
Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Norte & Co. v.
Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'fd in relevant part, 416 F.2d 1189
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); see Richland v. Crandall, 262 F.
Supp. 538, 553-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dictum).
39. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 766, 773-74 (3d
Cir. 1976); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. I11. 1975).
40. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 68-70 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 469-71.
41. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-29 (6th Cir.), cert
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). Because accountants do not actively solicit proxies,
there is some debate as to whether they can be liable under § 14(a). Liability, supra
note 15, at 751-53. Although SEC rule 14a-101 requires that an accountant's name be
listed on the proxy statement, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1981), courts have held that
a substantial connection must exist between the use of his name and the solicitation
effort in order for the accountant to be liable. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629
F.2d 62, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Yamamoto v. Omiya,
564 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1977); Liability, supra note 15, at 752-53. The Sixth
Circuit in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980), nevertheless assumed that accountants could be held
liable under § 14(a). Id. at 428. Another court has held that an accountant should not
escape liability merely because his involvement in the transaction is limited to the
preparation of the financial data. H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
42. Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Plant Indus.
v. Bregman, 490 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greet-
ing Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y.); ajfd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
43. Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Plant Indus.
v. Bregman, 490 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greet-
ing Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y.), affd in part, rev'd in part
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culpability. 44 The test of materiality is whether "there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider [the mislead-
ing statement] important in deciding how to vote." 45 This stringent
test apparently subsumes the causation element: 40 "So long as the
misstatement or omission [is] material, the causal relation between
violation and injury is sufficiently established . . . if 'the proxy solici-
tation itself .. .was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.' "47
Determining the proper standard of culpability has proven to be
most difficult. 48 Several courts have stated that they favor the adop-
tion of a negligence standard, 49 one court has left open the possibility
on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978). The proxy can be assumed to be an
essential link in effecting a corporate transaction when it is solicited in a directorial
election. Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980); see Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc.,
454 F. Supp. 787, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
44. Halpern v. Armstrong, 491 F. Supp. 365, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Plant Indus.
v. Bregman, 490 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greet-
ing Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The materiality
standard announced in TSC was formulated to counterbalance what the Court
assumed could be a low threshold of liability under § 14(a). Id. at 449 n.10. The
Court asserted that the danger of unlimited liability under § 14(a), which could
occur if a negligence standard were adopted, would be reduced by the onerous task
of proving that a misstatement was material. See id.
46. Comment, The Standard of Materiality in the Context of the Proxy Rules:
TSC v. Northway, 38 Ohio St. L.J. 379, 384-86 (1977); Note, Securities Law-Proxy
Regulation-A Fact is Material Under SEC Rule 14a-9 Only if There is a Substantial
Likelihood that a Reasonable Investor Would Consider it Important, 22 Vill. L. Rev.
205, 216 (1976).
47. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 (1976) (quoting Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)).
48. The difficulty of resolving this issue is illustrated by the variety of standards
recommended by commentators. Note, Federal Securities Law-Negligence Rather
Than Scienter Is the Test for Determining Directors' Liability for Violation of
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Emory L.J. 567, 576-79
(1974) (negligence) [hereinafter cited as Federal Securities]; Misleading Proxy, supra
note 27, at 585-87 (same); Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 486-89 (gross negli-
gence); Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 688-90 (modified scienter standard);
Liability, supra note 15, at 758-59 (flexible duty approach for different defendants).
49. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1403 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
887 (1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir.
1973); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp. 630, 652 (D. Del. 1980); Berkman v.
Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 792-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kenne-
cott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); Berman v.
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of strict liability, 50 and one court has held that scienter is required.5'
These dissimilar conclusions can be attributed to the nature of section
14(a) as an implied remedy .52 Like other sections that do not ex-
pressly create a cause of action, section 14(a) does not -spell out the
extent to which traditional fraud elements-such as scienter . . are
required."' 53 Moreover, the diverse classes of defendants that may be
liable under section 14(a)-" exacerbate the task of setting a uniform
standard of culpability. 55
Proper determination of the standard of culpability under section
14(a) is crucial because it defines the scope of section 14(a) and,
consequently, of rule 14a-9. 56 Imposition of a scienter standard serves
to shield defendants from potentially egregious liability, 57 whereas the
imposition of a negligence standard would more fully encourage accu-
rate disclosure in proxy solicitations.'
Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975): Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F.
Supp. 1096, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); affd in relevant part, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970): Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538,
553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
50. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir.) (hold-
ing restricted to accountants), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
52. See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 408 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973); Liability, supra note 15, at 744; Proper Standard, supra note
15, at 670-71; Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 579. Although § 14(a) does not
provide for agency enforcement, the SEC has express authority under § 21(d) of the
1934 Act to seek injunctive relief whenever it appears that a person -is engaged or
about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of [the Act].- 15 U.S.C. §
78u(d) (1976).
53. H. Bloomenthal, supra note 33, at 74.
54. See supra notes 36-41 and accomoanvina text.
55. Liability, supra note 15, at 757-58. Commentators have suggested differing
standards for each class of defendants. E.g., Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 688-
90 (modified scienter standard for outside directors), Board Nominees, supra note 220,
at 486-89 (gross negligence standard for board nominees): Misleading Proxy, supra
note 27, at 586-87 (negligence standard for accountants).
56. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973);
Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 670-72; Board Nomniness, supra note 22, at 469;
Federal Securities, supra note 48, at 569-71. See generally Note, Securities Regula-
tion: "Scienter" Means Less Protection for the Securities Exchange Commission, 46
Mo. L. Rev. 686 (1981) (discussion of the change in scope of § 10(b) actions after the
Supreme Court decision in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)).
57. Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 585-86; Federal Securities, supra note 48,
at 577-79; see Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 483-89 (contending that a standard
more stringent than gross negligence would discourage people from serving as outside
directors).
58. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstie v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973); Federal
Securities, supra note 48, at 576-79; Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 585-86.
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II. THE PROXY PROVISIONS: WHAT STANDARD OF CULPABILITY?
The formula for determining the standard of culpability for an
implied cause of action under the securities laws was set forth by the
Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.5 The Court em-
ployed a three-step analysis, which included an examination of the
section's language, legislative history, and relationship to other secur-
ities provisions."0
A. Statutory Language
As the Supreme Court in Hochfelder stated, "[a]scertainment of
congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created by
a particular section of the [securities acts] must . . . rest primarily on
the language of that section."' 1 For example, the Hochfelder Court
determined that language in section 10(b) such as "manipulative,"
"device" and "contrivance" was strong evidence of a congressional
intent to proscribe only intentional conduct.12  Indeed, the Court
found that the use of such words, standing alone, could be dispositive
on the issue of culpability.6 3 Conversely, the absence of language
evincing a congressional prohibition on only fraudulent conduct is
indicative of a lesser culpability standard.6 4 Thus, in Aaron v. SEC,05
the Supreme Court determined the standard of liability under the
three subparagraphs of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
(1933 Act)66 on the basis of the presence or absence of the language
found in section 10(b) .67 The Court held that a scienter requirement
was intended by Congress under subparagraph 1, which contains the
terms "device," "scheme" and "artifice," '6 8 but not intended under
subparagraphs 2 and 3, which contain no such language connoting
59. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
60. Id. at 197-211. In Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the Supreme Court
followed a similar analysis in determining whether scienter was required under the
various subdivisions of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976), id. at 695-
700, but used only two steps because it found the legislative history and the language
to be determinative on the culpability issue. Id. at 700 n.19.
61. 425 U.S. at 200, accord Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir.
1979), af'd, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); see SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 68
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980).
62. 425 U.S. at 197-99; see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 690 (1980).
63. 425 U.S. at 200-01; see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-97 (1980).
64. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1980); Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973); see Liability, supra note 15, at 755; Misleading
Proxy, supra note 27, at 584-85; Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 480.
65. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
67. 446 U.S. at 695-97.
68. Id. at 696-97.
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"knowing or intentional practices."'6  In effect, the Court presumed
that when Congress desired to impose a scienter standard under the
securities laws, it knew what words to put into the statute.
Section 14(a) unlike section 17(a)(1) and section 10(b), is devoid of
language indicating a scienter requirement. 70  In fact, as the Second
Circuit has observed, the language of section 14(a) is extremely
"broad, extending to all proxy regulation *necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors' and not limited
[as in section 10(b)] by any words connoting fraud or deception."'
Such language quite plainly evidences a congressional focus upon the
effect of misstatements on the protected class rather than upon the
extent of liability of the responsible individuals.7 2 The plain meaning
of section 14(a), like that of sections 17(a)(2) and (3), "does not require
a 'showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to pro-
tecting investors.' ",73 Thus, consonant with the general principle of
69. Id. at 696.
70. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.. 535 F.2d 761-777 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281. 1298-99 (2d Cir. 1973): we Proper
Standard, supra note 15, at 676; Board Nominees, supra note 22. at 477-80: Liabil-
ity, supra note 15, at 745. Section 14(a) provides: "'It shall be unlawful for any
person, by the use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to
permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect
of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section [ 12]
of this title." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
71. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (quot-
ing §14(a)).
72. See GerstIe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281. 1299 (2d Cir. 1973); 3
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(430). at 204.71: 2 L. Loss, supra
note 1, at 868-71; W. Painter, supra note 27, § 5.09, at 228: Note, Disclosure of
Litigation Involving Accountants Under SEC Proxy Rule 14a-9, 62 Ceo. L.J. 1229,
1237 (1974); Shareholder Democracy. supra note 19, at 153.
73. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200 (1963)). The Supreme Court, in determin-
ing the proper standard of culpability, has tried to divine whether the language of a
section in question was designed to regulate a particular type of conduct or to provide
relief for certain classes of protected individuals. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697
(1980); see SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200 (1963). In
both Aaron and Capital Gains, the Supreme Court was faced with statutes that
contained the words "fraud" and "deceit." Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 696-97
(1980) (§ 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (1976)); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (§ 206(2) of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)). In both cases, however, the Court
found that the word "operate" preceding "fraud" and "deceit" signaled that Congress
was focusing on the effect of the wrongful conduct rather than the state of mind of
the defendant. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 (1980); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197-201 (1963). Because of this focus, the Court
held in both cases that scienter was not required. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 650, 697
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affording the securities laws a meaning as broad as their language will
permit,74 no such requirement should be inferred unless the legislative
history contains "a very clear expression. . . of congressional intent to
the contrary. 75
B. Legislative History
The legislative history of the securities laws has generally been
considered by the courts as less than helpful in divining the intent of
Congress, 76 and that of section 14(a) is no exception. 77 In Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. ,78 however, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the legislative history of section 14(a) was convincing evidence of
a congressional design to prohibit only intentional fraud.7 9 The court
reached this conclusion after reviewing "one example"80 in the Senate
report, as well as the "few times the proxy section was discussed in
debate.""' Although language contained in these "informative sec-
tions" 82 illustrated a congressional concern with "'promiscuous solici-
(1980); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200-01 (1963).
Section 14(a), which is devoid of any language indicating scienter, is, by its very
terms, designed to protect investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Thus, like the
sections under consideration in Aaron and Capital Gains, §14(a) should "be con-
strued 'not technically and restrictively' but flexibly to effectuate [its] remedial
purposes." Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
JJ., concurring and dissenting) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)).
74. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Touche Ross & Co. v. Red-
ington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
75. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980); accord Ernst & Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-06 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 697-700 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-02 (1976); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 586 F.2d
1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp.
853, 860 (D. Del. 1972); Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 679; Misleading Proxy.
supra note 27, at 585; Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 482.
77. Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 677-80; Misleading Proxy, supra note 27,
at 584-85; Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 480-82; Liability, supra note 15, at
755-56.
78. 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980), reviewed by
Note, Misleading Proxy Statement-Outside Accountants Can Be Held Liable Under
Rule 14a-9 Only Upon a Showing of Scienter, 56 Notre Dame Law. 579 (1981); Note,
Liability of Accountants for Proxy Violations-The Appropriate Standard of Culpa-
bility, 56 Wash. L. Rev. 743 (1981).
79. 623 F.2d at 429-30.
80. Id. at 429 n.7 (citing S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934)).
81. Id. at 430 (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 6544, 7712-14 (1934)).
82. Id. at 430. Interestingly, the court in Adams placed significant weight on the
language used in the congressional debates, 623 F.2d at 428-30, but totally ignored
the language that Congress put into the statute. See id; Misleading Proxy, supra note
27, at 584.
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tation of ... proxies' '" s3 and "'unscrupulous corporate officials ...
concealing and distorting facts,"'"" the legislative history never men-
tions a culpability standard. 5
The absence of any such statement in the debates or reports has led
another court to conclude that "the legislative history. . . provides no
significant assistance" in determining a culpability standard." At
best, the legislative materials are ambiguous on this issue and clearly
do not mandate a scienter requirement.8 7 In determining the culpa-
bility standards of other sections of the securities laws, the Supreme
Court has ruled that "[i]in the absence of a conflict between reason-
ably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute
must prevail." '  Because the legislative history can also be read
consistently with a negligence standard, the plain meaning of section
14(a) should control.8 9 Moreover, such a standard is consistent with
Congress's desire "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"'90 by placing the responsibility for mis-
representations on those in control of the information.
C. The Statutory Scheme
Although the 1933 and 1934 Acts have different objectives,"' they
should be construed in pari materia as a comprehensive scheme of
83. Id. at 429 (emphasis omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
77 (1934)).
84. id.
85. See Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 584-85: Board Nominees, Tupra note
22, at 482; Liability, supra note 15, at 755-56, Proper Standard. supra note 15, at
677-80.
86. Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Del.
1972); cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
("It is apparent from the Congressional purpose in enacting section 14(a) and from
the adoption of Rule 14a-9 by the Commission, that scienter is not required in such
an action."), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
87. Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 585; Board Nominees, supra note 229, at
482; Liability, supra note 15, at 756; Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 680.
88. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700 (1980).
89. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299-1300 (2d Cir.
1973).
90. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963),
quoted in Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 706 (1980) (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
JJ., concurring & dissenting); see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5
(1933); Securities Act, 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1933) (statement of Huston Thomp-
son. Esq.)
91. H. Henn, Handbook of the Law of Corporations and Other Business Enter-
prises §§ 295-97 (2d ed. 1970). The Securities Act of 1933 deals mainly with the
initial distribution of securities by the issuer, id. § 295, at 581; K. Skousen, supra note
27, at 19, whereas the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates trading in securities
by investors. H. Henn, supra, § 296, at 590.
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securities regulation.92  As the Supreme Court has noted, "the inter-
dependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly a
relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has
chosen." ' 93 An examination of the culpability standard under other
sections of the securities laws similar in purpose to section 14(a) is
important in determining whether the adoption of a particular stand-
ard is compatible with the entire scheme of securities regulation. 4
By comparing section 14(a) with other provisions of the 1934 Act
that deal with misstatements and omissions, it is evident that section
14(a) is unlike sections such as 10(b),9 -5 14(e) 96 and 18, which require
proof of scienter.98 Section 18 expressly creates a cause of action for
damages on behalf of buyers and sellers of securities for false and
misleading statements in documents that are required to be filed with
the SEC. 99 Section 10(b) applies to any fraudulent conduct in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of corporate securities.100 Unlike
these two broad sections, which encompass activity in numerous areas
92. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206
(1976).
93. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976) (quoting SEC v.
National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 466 (1969)); see Misleading Proxy, supra note 27,
at 583.
94. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206-11 (1976); Proper Stand-
ard, supra note 15, at 680-81.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 78jb)(1976).
96. Id. § 78n(e).
97. Id. § 78r.
98. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (§ 10(b) injunctive action); Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (§ 10(b) damage suit); Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968)(§ 18 damage action), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 903 (1969); Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1032
(S.D. Ind. 1977) (§ 14(e) damage action); see Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 n.6 (6th Cir.) (dictum) (§ 18 requires scienter), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); see Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 551-52
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909,
915-16 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Note, Section 18 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back Into the Toothless Tiger, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 115, 115 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bite Back]. Section 18 ex-
pressly provides for a good faith defense; the defendant is liable unless he proves "that
he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or
misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). In essence, the good faith standard is a
scienter standard and will not be satisfied by a showing of ordinary negligence. 3 L.
Loss, supra note 1, at 1752 (Good faith "seems to be [a] first cousin to scienter."); see
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 & n.12 (1976).
100. SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 75-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1012 (1980); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); H. Henn, supra note 91, § 298, at
597; Varnava, supra note 3, at 318-19; Bite Back, supra note 99, at 115.
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of securities regulation,' 0' section 14(a) deals only with the solicitation
of proxies. 0 2 Unlike proxy statements, most of the documents within
the scope of section 10(b) or section 18 are not distributed to share-
holders with the intention of inducing either action or inaction by
them. 10 3 The imposition of a more demanding standard of conduct
under section 14(a) than that imposed under sections 10(b) and 18 is a
reasonable interpretation of the heightened need for adequate disclo-
sure in proxy solicitations.0 4
As alternate means of achieving corporate control, 0 s proxies and
tender offers have been subject to similar abuse and, consequently, to
analogous regulation. 0 6  Section 14(a) should, therefore, be com-
pared to section 14(e),' 0 7 which regulates tender offers.' 08  Due to the
language of section 14(e), which "sounds essentially in fraud," much
like sections 10(b) and 18,109 courts have interpreted section 14(e) as
requiring proof of scienter." 0 The Sixth Circuit found the similarity
101. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973): Board
Nominees, supra note 22, at 479 n.55.
102. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973); Board
Nominees, supra note 22, at 479 n.55.
103. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973):
Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 479 n.55: see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976).
104. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1289-300, 1300 n.18 (2d
Cir. 1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 863 (D. Del.
1972).
105. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430-31 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News2811, 2811-13. The proxy contest,
however, is usually controlled by management and is used as a mechanism for their
self-perpetuation. The proxy contest thus is really not a viable tool for bringing about
a change in corporate control. Comment, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State
Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1138 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Tender Offers]; see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.53
(5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. LeRoy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979).
106. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813. The drafters intended the tender
offer provision "to provide the same kind of disclosure requirements" as required
under the proxy rules. 113 Cong. Rec. 24,665 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
107. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
109. Billet v. Storage Tech. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-64 (2d Cir. 1973)1.
110. Indiana Nat'l Bank v. Mobil Oil Corp., 457 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (S.D. Ind.
1977); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063,
1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 409 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1969); see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (D. Tex.), cert.
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between tender offers and proxy solicitations to mandate the adoption
of an analogous scienter standard under section 14(a).'
Although the tender offer provisions should be construed to operate
in harmony with the proxy provisions,"12 it must be recognized that
regulation of takeover bids presents different policy concerns.", 3 Con-
gress was aware that tender offers are often beneficial to sharehold-
ers" 4 and that regulation discouraging their use could harm, rather
than protect, investors."15 Thus, in enacting section 14(e), Congress
avoided "tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the takeover bid.""10 As the
Supreme Court has noted, Congress phrased section 14(e) in a manner
that gives both the target's management and the offeror an opportu-
nity to express and explain their positions without making the section
a weapon against takeover bids." 7
Consistent with this philosophy," 8 Congress specifically inserted
words such as "fraudulent," "manipulative" and "deceptive,"'I'D thus
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); A & K.R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R.,
437 F. Supp. 636, 642 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Billet v. Storage Tech. Corp., 72 F.R.D.
583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
111. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430-31 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
112. Bath Indus. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 110 (7th Cir. 1970); see Electronic Spe-
cialty Corp. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 945-48 (2d Cir. 1969);
113 Cong. Rec. 24,665 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits).
113. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 & n.53 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp, 443 U.S.
173 (1979); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.17 (2d Cir.
1973); Tender Offers, supra note 105, at 1154-55.
114. E.g., S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811, 2813.
The primary mechanism through which a tender offer is achieved is offering a price
to shareholders which is significantly above the market price. See W. Carey & M.
Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 1562; Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 317, 317 (1967); Hayes & Taussing, Tactics of Cash
Takeover Bids, Harv. Bus. Rev., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 139-140, Tender Offers, supra
note 105, at 1134.
115. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2$11, 2813.
116. S. Rep. No. 550., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
117. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); see Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Humana,
Inc. v. American Medicorp Inc., 445 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
118. See 113 Cong. Rec. 24,665 (1967) (Statement of Sen. Williams) ("There is no
intention in any way to prohibit tender offers. As a matter of fact, I think it might
encourage them.").
119. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595-96 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021, 1027-28 (E.D. La.
1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1063,
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evincing an intent to limit liability under section 14(e) to conduct
made with some degree of scienter.'2 0  To do otherwise, and make
those involved in tender offers liable for every detail, would defeat the
countervailing interest in encouraging beneficial takeover bids.' 2 1
Proxy regulation, however, does not require a balancing of the need
for reliable information against the adverse effects of stringent regula-
tion.' 2 2 Unlike takeover bids, proxies need not be encouraged: Man-
agement must by necessity utilize the proxy system.' 2 3 Much like the
differing standards under the three paragraphs of section 17, there is
nothing anomalous about having a negligence standard under section
14(a), and a scienter standard under section 14(e).
Section 14(a) can be better analogized124 to section 11 of the 1933
Act,' 25 which, in dealing with misstatements and omissions in registra-
tion statements, provides for a negligence standard.'' -2 Both section
14(a) and section 11 apply to single documents that are -direct . . .
impersonal [and] aimed at large groups of persons who are expected to
act [or refrain from acting] on the basis of the information pre-
1077-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part. rev'd in part on other grounds 409 F.2d 937
(2d Cir. 1969); see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
120. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
121. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173
(1979); Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover
Bids, 1967: Hearings on S. 510 Before Subcomin. on Securities of the Senate Coinin.
on Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1977) (statement of Sen.
Corbin) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. The original bill to amend the 1934
Act would have imposed on tender offerors the short-swing profit liability provisions
of § 16 of the 1934 Act. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., I11 Cong. Rec. 28,257-259
(1965); see Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 n.44 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S.
173 (1979). This strict standard of liability was rejected after it engendered consider-
able opposition. 112 Cong. Rec. 19,003 (statement of the SEC): Senate Hearings,
supra, at 123 (statements of Prof. Painter and Sen. Williams).
122. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
124. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.. 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3rd Cir. 1976); 3
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(431), at 204.72-.73: Note, False
and Misleading Proxy Statements, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 162, 192-94 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as False & Misleading]; see Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 674.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
126. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976): Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976): Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,
272 (9th Cir. 1961) (dictum); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d
Cir. 1951) (dictum); In re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 083, 297 (N.D. Cal.
1978); Strauss v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Burger
v. CPC Int'l Inc., 76 F.R.D. 183, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1977): Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F.
Supp. 878, 884-885 (D. Mass. 1973); 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18,
§ 8.4(320), at 204.18; 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1729-30; \W'y'ant & Smith, BarChris:
A Revaluation of Prospectus Liability?, 3 Ga. L. Rev. 122, 125 (1968).
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sented."12 7 These sections were designed to ensure adequate and reli-
able disclosure in two important areas of securities regulation-the
buying and voting of shares. 12 8 The sole difference between the two
sections lies in the status of the plaintiff; the plaintiff under section 11
is a securities investor, 129 while the plaintiff under section 14(a) is a
voting shareholder.130  Because both have similar disclosure needs,' 3 '
it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to afford an individual less
protection as a shareholder than he received as a purchaser. Indeed,
due to the similarity of sections 14(a) and 11, it is very likely that
Congress assumed that the SEC would adopt a standard in section
14(a) analogous to that in section 11.132
Section 11 expressly provides a "due diligence" defense for all de-
fendants other than the corporate issuer. 133  To establish the due
diligence defense, the defendant must show that he exercised the
degree of care of "a prudent man in the management of his own
property."' 134  The defense varies depending upon the status of the
127. 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(431), at 204.72; see
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
128. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976); 3
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(431), at 204.72.
129. McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1980); In re
Gap Stores Sec. Litig. 79 F.R.D. 283, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Strauss v. Holiday Inns.
Inc., 460 F. Supp. 729, 730-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp.
878, 880 (D. Mass. 1973).
130. See, e.g., Gruss v. Curtis Publishing Co., 534 F.2d 1396, 1399-1401 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887 (1976); Bertoglio v. Texas Int'l Co., 488 F. Supp.
630, 633-34 (D. Del. 1980); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F.
Supp. 787, 789-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
131. See Lederman, Preparation of Securities Acts Registration Statements and
Reports: Meeting the Obligation to Provide a Basis for Appraising the Prospective
Impact of Historical Financial Information, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 770, 770 (1974).
132. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976),
False & Misleading, supra note 124, at 192-96; Proper Standard, supra note 15, at
674; see 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(431), at 204.72.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). The due diligence defense relieves a defendant
of liability upon a showing that he exercised due care in carrying out his duties. See
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 3 A.
Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(321), at 204.19; 3 L. Loss, supra
note 1, at 1726-27; Note. Newly Registered Securities and Accountants' Liability to
Third Party Investors Under the Federal Securities Law, 5 Golden Gate L. Rev. 305,
306-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Newly Registered Securities]. The due diligence
defense applies only to defendants other than the corporate issuer. 3 A. Bromberg &
L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(320), at 204.18; W. Knepper, Liability of Corpo-
rate Officers and Directors § 10.03, at 250 (3d ed. 1978).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976); 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1726. The due diligence
defense is a personal defense. See In re Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 298
(N.D. Cal. 1978). Hence, a defendant must show that he himself exercised due
diligence in the circumstances of the particular case. See Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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defendant as an "expert" or a "'nonexpert": 135 A nonexpert may rea-
sonably rely on the expertise of those employed to prepare any special-
ized portion of the registration statement.'1 
.
The adoption of a due diligence standard of care similar to that of
section 11 would be consistent with the regulatory scheme and would
not render superfluous other sections of the securities laws that were
designed to address different problems. 37  For example, a false or
misleading proxy solicitation that occurs in connection with a merger
may be actionable under both section 10(b) and section 14(a). 13  The
question then becomes whether an action can be maintained under
section 14(a) if such an action could not be maintained under section
10(b) without proof of scienter. The Supreme Court answered this
question affirmatively in SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,'139 when it
135. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976). The Act provides for three different standards
of liability. Id. The defendant who makes a misstatement and did not rely on the
authority of an expert can escape liability by showing that he had "after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of
the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading." Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A). If the
defendant himself is the expert, then he must show that lie had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe. . . that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, or [that]
such part of the registration statement did not fairly represent his statement as an
expert." Id. § 77k(b)(3)(B). The defendant who himself is not the expert, but relied
on the opinion of an expert, must prove that "he had no reasonable ground to believe
and did not believe. . . that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the registration statement did
not fairly represent the statement of the expert." Id. § 77k(b)(3)(C). There is also a
provision for reliance on statements by public officials. Id. § 77k(b)(3)(D) (1976).
136. F. Bloomenthal, supra note 33, § 11.03, at 67-68; W. Knepper, supra note
133, § 10.03, at 250-51; J. Wiesen, The Securities Acts and Independent Auditors:
What Did Congress Intend? 21-22 (1978).
137. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 & n. 18 (2d Cir. 1973):
see Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 863 (D. Del. 1972): 3
A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 8.4(430), at 204.71; Board Nominees,
supra note 22, at 479. The SEC has long favored the adoption of a negligence
standard under § 14(a). Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 446-
47 (6th Cir.) (Weisk, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing en bane), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). As the dissent in Adams pointed out, "it is well settled
that the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is
entitled to considerable weight." Id. at 447; accord United States v. National Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 719 (1975).
138. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 467-69 (1969): Dasho v. Susque-
hanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11, 29 n.42 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972);
2 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 18, § 6.5(313)(3), at 136.5; W. Painter,
supra note 27, § 9.03; at 370-72; False & Misleading, supra note 124, at 165; see
Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., 415 F.2d 1326, 1330-31 (7th Cir. 1969).
139. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
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held that the existence of an action under section 14(a) would not
affect section 10(b).1 40  The Court reasoned that the two sections
apply to different aspects of securities regulation, section 10(b) to the
purchase and sale of securities, and section 14(a) to the solicitation of
proxies; 4 1 thus, any overlap is "neither unusual nor unfortunate."1 42
Although the overlap of two implied remedies posed no problem in
National Securities, the Hochfelder Court expressed concern that a
judicially created remedy under one section could allow plaintiffs to
circumvent the express statutory provisions of another section.' 4 3
Thus, one reason for requiring a scienter standard for actions under
section 10(b) was to prevent the disruption of the express, carefully
drafted procedural protections of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. 144
It has been argued that the adoption of a negligence standard under
section 14(a) would undercut the express remedy of section 18, ' 4
because a plaintiff could bring an action under section 14(a) without
proving reliance.' 46 There is some overlap between section 14(a) and
section 18 because the proxy, as a filed document,'4 7 comes within the
ambit of section 18.148 The two sections, however, address different
aspects of securities regulation.' 49 Section 18 is a regulatory gap-filler
designed to promote the reliability of documents filed with the
SEC.' 50 The majority of documents covered by section 18 are not
140. Id. at 468.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-11 & n.28 (1976).
144. Id. Among the procedural restrictions mentioned were the provision for
posting a bond to cover attorney's fees and the provision for a short statute of
limitations. Id. at 209-10.
145. See, e.g., Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 n.6 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp.
853, 863 (D. Del. 1972).
146. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 & n.6 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp.
853, 863 (D. Del. 1972). The Supreme Court has indicated, Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 380 (1970), and at least one circuit has held, Selk v. Saint
Paul Ammonia Prods., Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 638-39 (8th Cir. 1979), that reliance is
unnecessary in an action under § 14(a).
147. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1981). Proxies must be filed with the SEC 10 days in
advance of their distribution. Id.
148. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 429 & n.6 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,
1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853,
863 (D. Del. 1972).
149. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir.
1973); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 863 (D. Del. 1972);
Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 479.
150. See Bite Back, supra note 99, at 116, 128. There are a vast number of
documents which come under § 18, but most of them go unread. Id. A plaintiff must,
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distributed to shareholders.'51 The usefulness of section 18 depends
on the extent to which the public actually seeks out and uses the
documents stored in the SEC files. 52 The only document covered by
section 14(a), however, is the proxy statement, 5 3 which is sent out to
shareholders with the intention of inducing action in reliance on the
statements contained therein. 154 There is, therefore, nothing unusual
about having a higher standard of care under a section that regulates
documents which invite shareholder reliance, and a lower standard of
care under a section that deals with documents which often merely
collect dust in the SEC archives. 55 Thus, the imposition of a negli-
gence standard, similar to section 11, would be compatible with the
regulatory scheme. 156
III. POLICY CONCERNS
The proper standard of culpability under section 14(a) and rule
14a-9 must effectuate the broad remedial purposes and policies of
proxy regulations. 57 The importance of the proxy provisions to en-
suring informed voting by shareholders 58 implies the need to impose a
therefore, prove reliance on the documents that allegedly contain misleading infor-
mation. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 196S). cert. denied. 395
U.S. 903 (1969); Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
151. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973);
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1359 (1966); Bite
Back, supra note 99, at 128; see Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp.
853, 863 (D. Del. 1972).
152. Cohen, supra note 151, at 1360; Bite Back, supra note 99, at 116, 128.
153. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973); Board
Nominees, supra note 22, at 479 n.55.
154. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir.
1976); Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 479 n.55.
155. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973):
Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 479; see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.,
351 F. Supp. 853, 863 (D. Del. 1972).
156. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973).
157. This fourth step in the statutory construction analysis, the examination of the
policy considerations that may have influenced Congress in the formulation of the
securities laws, was not undertaken in either Hoclfelder or Aaron because in each of
these cases the Court found the language and the legislative history dispositive on the
culpability issue. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 700 n.19 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976). An examination of the policies underlying
§ 14(a), however, further illuminates the propriety of a negligence standard. Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit found policy considerations dispositive on the culpability issue.
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d, 422, 428-31 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
158. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976);
Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1975): Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973); Perelman v. Pennsylvania Real
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high standard of care on all individuals involved in the preparation of
proxy materials.159 Analysis of the obligations of the different classes
of defendants responsible for the accuracy of proxy materials reveals
that a negligence standard is neither unwarranted nor unexpected.10
A. Directors and Corporation
Even at common law, directors have a fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of a corporation to exercise reasonable care in the discharge of
their duties. '6  The imposition of a negligence standard under section
14(a), therefore, merely requires directors to perform in a similar
manner when soliciting the votes of their shareholders.1 2  Moreover,
a high standard of care under the proxy rules would not be onerous.
Directors are not required to include every detail about the corpora-
tion, because such a barrage of information would defeat the disclo-
sure purposes of section 14(a). 163 "Fair accuracy and not perfec-
Estate Inv. Trust, 432 F. Supp. 1298, 1300-01 (E.D. Pa. 1977); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc.,
425 F. Supp. 310, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 582;
Federal Securities, supra note 48, at 568-70; Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 468-
69; Shareholders' Remedies, supra note 24, at 1126-27.
159. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299-1300 (2d Cir. 1973); Berkman
v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Federal
Securities, supra note 48, at 576-79.
160. See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 68-70 (D.C. Cir.) (board
nominee), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478
F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973) (corporation); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp.
695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (outside director); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp.
1096, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dictum) (director), afj'd in relevant part, 416 F.2d
1189 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). But see Adams v. Standard
Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir.) (accountant), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1067 (1980).
161. E.g., Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787, 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Norte & Co. v. Huffines, 304 F. Supp. 1096, 1109-10 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), afJ'd in relevant part, 416 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970); Federal Securities, supra note 48, at 576-77; see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
162. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300 (2d Cir. 1973).
Although the imposition of a negligence standard does place a burden on the direc-
tors, it is a burden necessary to ensure the full disclosure of material information to
which shareholders are entitled under the securities laws. Berman v. Thomson, 403
F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. 111. 1975); see Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535
F. 2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir, 1976); Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454
F. Supp. 787, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
163. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 800 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Allen v. Penn. Cent. Co., 350 F. Supp. 697, 703
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
see SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F. 2d 62, 67 & n.4 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1012 (1980); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 774 (3d
Cir. 1976).
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tion"'164 would not be an overly difficult standard for a circumspect
businessman to meet.16 5
Indeed, in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,'6 the Second Circuit
left open the possibility that the correct standard for a corporation
should be one of strict liability as it exists under section 11.16- The
imposition of a strict liability standard, however, should not be in-
ferred without clear evidence of congressional intent.6s The absence
of evidence of such intent with respect to section 14(a) argues in favor
of a negligence standard. 69 Directors should be held accountable for
their failure to use reasonable diligence in light of the particular
circumstances of the case. 70  It follows that the corporation will be
similarly liable for the negligence of its directors.
B. Accountants
In enacting the securities laws, Congress placed the accountant in
an important position in the scheme of securities regulation.1'- As the
164. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1200 (2d
Cir. 1978), quoted in Plant Indus. v. Bregman, 490 F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); accord Laurenzano v. Einbender, 448 F.2d 1. 6 (2d Cir. 1971): Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 800 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970). There is also no need for a director to be "'clairvoyant." Smallwood
v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 602 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873
(1974).
165. It has been argued that outside directors and board nominees should be held
to a lesser standard of culpability because they are not involved in the day-to-day
operation of the corporation. Berman v. Thomson. 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Proper Standard, supra note 15, at 688-90; see Gould v. American- Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976): Board Nominees, supra note 22, at 486-
89. Courts have held, however, that outside directors must be held to the same
standard as inside directors, because it is the adequacy of disclosure, not the extent of
liability, that is of paramount importance under the proxy rules. Gould v. American-
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976), Berman v. Thomson, 403
F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975). But see Board Nominees, supra note 22 at 486-89
(gross negligence standard for board nominees).
166. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
167. Id. at 1300-01; accord Federal Securities. supra note 48, at 571-72 & n.28;
see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation Cases and Materials 1023-24 (4th
ed. 1977); supra note 133 and accompanying text.
168. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D. Del.
1972). But see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 167. at 1024.
169. Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 859-60 (D. Del.
1972).
170. The court in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973),
mentioned that in determining negligence under § 14(a), a court may take into
account the need for haste when the proxy was prepared "'in the hurly-burly of
election contests." Id. at 1300 n.19; see General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc.,
403 F.2d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 1968).
171. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1301 & n.20 (2d Cir. 1973);
R. Jennings & H. Marsh, supra note 167, at 1023-24.
172. W. Knepper, supra note 133, at 377-78; J. Wiesen, supra note 136, at 21-23;
Bradley, The Public Auditor, in Accountants' Liability 76-77 (J. McCord ed. 1969);
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"watchdog" of the public interest, the accountant is in a strategic spot
to detect fraud and incorrect statements in financial reports.173 Con-
gress specifically rejected the utilization of government accountants to
implement the financial disclosure rules of the securities laws and
instead relied on independent public accountants to fulfill this essen-
tial function. 74 In effect, Congress granted an "exclusive franchise,"
to the accounting profession: Those seeking access to the securities
markets are required to utilize its services. 175
Charged with protecting the public interest, an accountant's profes-
sional obligations under the securities laws are broader than those
imposed at common law. 7  These obligations are owed "not only to
the client who pays his fee, but also to investors, creditors and others
who may rely on the financial statements which he certifies."177 The
accountant's role, therefore, is not collateral to a securities transac-
tion-he is a full participant in any such undertaking in which his
reports are used. 78
When accurate financial disclosure has been deemed crucial to
implementing the policies of the securities laws, the accountant has
been held to a professional standard of due care. 17 Thus, the express
provisions of the securities acts that deal with accountant liability,
sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, explicitly provide for a negligence
standard.8 0 The most important data in registration statements and
prospectuses are the financial statements prepared by the accoun-
tant.' 18
Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to Third Parties, 52 Notre Dame
Law. 838, 839 (1977).
173. H. Kripke, The SEC and Corporate Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a
Purpose 276-77 (1979); Marcheso, Mid-Program Recapitulation and Critique, in
Accountants' Liability 137-38 (J. McCord ed. 1969); Margolis, Sanctions Against
Accountantsfor Violations of the Securities Laws: A Reappraisal, 4 Del. J. Corp. L.
399, 399 (1979); Note, The Criminal Liability of Public Accountants: A Study of
United States v. Simon, 46 Notre Dame Law. 564, 598 (1971).
174. "Securities Act," Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-61 (1934) (statement of Col. A.H. Carter, Pres., N.Y.
Soc'y of Certified Public Accountants); J. Wiesen, supra note 136, at 27-30; Sonde,
The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Obser-
vations, 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1, 2 (1973).
175. H. Kripke, supra note 173, at 276-77.
176. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane);
see Mess, supra note 172, at 855-56.
177. In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957), quoted in
Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
178. See Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp 180, 186-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Mess, supra
note 172, at 850.
179. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Wyant & Smith, supra note 126, at 122-24.
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(c), 771 (1976); Newly Registered Securities, supra note 133,
at 305-12.
181. K. Skousen, supra note 27, at 22; Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some
Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1175 (1970). Numerous cases
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The policies underlying the proxy rules are the same as those that
apply to the registration and prospectus provisions. 82  Although the
status of the plaintiff changes from "'buyer" to "shareholder," his
disclosure needs are the same. 83 Congress, in enacting section 14(a),
made no provision for the accountant's duty of care, but the congres-
sional policies behind proxy regulation indicate that a standard of due
care was envisioned by the drafters. 8 4
Concluding that an accountant should be liable under the proxy
provisions only upon a showing of scienter, 85 however, the Sixth
Circuit based its decision on a different policy argument. Because no
privity is required between an accountant and a shareholder under
section 14(a), the court reasoned that a low standard of culpability
would result in unlimited liability for the accountant.16' This argu-
ment is essentially a restatement of the old common-law doctrine
espoused by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven &
Co.,1 7 when he refused to hold accountants liable to third parties for
a "thoughtless slip or blunder." 188
The Ultramares view, however, is too narrow to comply with the
concept of accountants liability under the federal securities laws.'
have held that negligence is the standard of culpability under § 12 of the 1933 Act.
Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764, 767 (10th
Cir. 1980); Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 1978); Franklin Say.
Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 526-27 (2d Cir. 1977); Nelson v. Quimby Island
Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1382 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Billet
v. Storage Tech. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 583, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Odette v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see Trussel v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 767-68 (D. Colo. 1964) (dictum). For cases
holding that negligence is the culpability standard under § 11, see supra note 126.
182. Compare In re Gap Stores See. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 297 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(Section 11 "was designed to protect the investing public by compelling detailed
disclosure of facts."), with J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)
("[A]mong [§ 14(a)'s] chief purposes is the 'protection of investors.'" (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976)). Like §§ 11 and 12, the proxy provisions are designed to
regulate the distribution of a key document that, to be effective, must be accurate
and not misleading. Board Nominees, supra note 22. at 469; see Misleading Proxy,
supra note 27, at 586; Shareholder Democracy. supra note 19, at 153; supra note 23
and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
184. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3rd Cir.
1976); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281. 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973);
Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Richland v. Crandall,
262 F. Supp. 538, 553 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); False & Misleading, supra note 124, at
192-96; Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 585-87.
185. Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428-29 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
186. Id. at 428-29; see Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, passim; Liability, supra
note 15, at 754-55.
187. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
188. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
189. North, Disclosure: A View From The SEC, in Accountants' Liability 98-99
(J. McCord ed. 1969); see Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and
1982] 1445
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Congress, in enacting the securities laws, chose to hold accountants
liable for negligence to third parties despite the contrary common-law
view. 90 Justice William 0. Douglas, one of the principal drafters of
the 1933 Act,' explained the liability of accountants under that Act:
To say the least the Act goes as far in protection of purchasers of
securities as plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully
urged the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a
creditor. The change which that court thought so "revolutionary"
as to be "wrought by legislation" has been made. And the duty
placed on experts such as accountants has not been measured by the
expert's relation to his employer but by his service to investors.' 90
The proxy provisions, labeled by one commentator a "little Securities
Act" due to their analogous disclosure requirements, 19 3 are similarly
an effort by Congress to hold the accountant to a standard of reason-
able care. 194
Moreover, the Ultramares concern that accountants would be liable
"in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeter-
minate class,"' 195 is not present when the negligent misstatement oc-
curs in a proxy solicitation.196 An accountant prepares a proxy state-
Responsibility: Securities, Criminal, and Common Law, 13 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 247,
248-49 (1980).
190. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1879); Landell v. Ly-
brand, 264 Pa. 406, 408, 107 A. 783, 783 (1919) (per curiam); Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 172-77, 174 N.E. 441, 444-47 (1931); supra note
176 and accompanying text.
191. J. Wiesen, supra note 136, at 1.
192. Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 198
(1933) (footnote omitted).
193. 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 868.
194. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F. 2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976);
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973); Berman v.
Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ill. 1975); see National Home Prods., Inc. v.
Gray, 416 F. Supp. 1293, 1317 (D. Del. 1976); Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp.
538, 552-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
195. 255 N.Y. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
196. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973):
Misleading Proxy, supra note 27, at 585-86. The Supreme Court noted, in passing,
that Ultramares illustrated the potential for unlimited liability under § 10(b). Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976). The Ultramares holding,
however, has been eroded even at common law. Although several courts have reiter-
ated the Ultramares rationale, e.g., Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, 455 F. Supp 351,
359-60 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Bunge Corp. v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058, 1061-64 (D.N.D.
1974); Donovan Constr. Co. v. Woosley, 358 F. Supp. 375, 382-83 (W.D. Ark.
1973); Investment Corp. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291, 293-96 (Fla. 1968); Bonhiver
v. Graff, 311 Minn. 111, 128, 248 N.W. 2d 291, 301-303 (1976); Anderson v. Boone
County Abstract Co., 418 S.W.2d 123, 127-28 (Mo. 1967), the trend has been toward
expanding liability of accountants to third parties who are members of a foreseeable
class of plaintiffs. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner
& Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F.
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ment with the knowledge that it will be circulated to all shareholders
of record as of a given date. 9 7 Although this group may occasionally
be quite large, it is a finite group and distinguishable from the general
investing public.198  The time for which an accountant may be sued is
also determinable because under section 14(a) the relevant state stat-
ute of limitations applies.19 9 Finally, the amount of liability to third
parties is limited to the actual loss caused by the accountant's negli-
gence. 200
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of section 14(a) and rule 14a-9 is to ensure that
shareholders receive a clean proxy, one that is free from misleading
statements and omissions that may adversely affect their voting deci-
sions. In enacting section 14(a), Congress, recognizing the importance
of fair corporate suffrage, placed upon all those involved in the prepa-
ration of proxy materials the duty to exercise reasonable care in seeing
that they reflect the true condition of the corporation. To require a
scienter standard would be tantamount to condoning carelessness and
would thwart the policy of full disclosure inherent in section 14(a). A
negligence standard, however, fulfills the need for the free flowv of
information that is mandated by the realities of modern corporate life.
Michael J. Hetzer
Supp. 85, 90-93 (D.R.I. 1968): Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.V.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa
1969); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.\V.2d 378, 382-83 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361-63, 372 N.E.2d 315. 318-19, 401
N.Y.S.2d 474, 477-78 (1977); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.V.2d 873,
876-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liabil-
ity of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. 507, 513 (1976): Mess, supra
note 172, at 850: see Comment, Accountants' Liability For Negligence-A Conten-
porary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 401, 416-17 (1979).
197. The shareholders that receive a proxy are those owning stock as of the record
date of the proxy. H. Henn, supra note 91, § 176, at 328-29. When a shareholder sells
his stock to a third party, legal title passes to the transferee, but as far as the
corporation is concerned, the record owner must be regarded as the real owner for
several purposes, including the right to vote by proxy. H. Henn, supra note 91, § 176,
at 327-29; N. Lattin, Lattin on Corporations § 89, at 356 (2d ed. 1971). The record
date varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Nev York, the record date must be set
at least ten days, but no more than fifty days, prior to the date of the shareholder
meeting. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 604 (McKinney 1964).
198. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d Cir. 1973):
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974); Misleading Proxy.
supra note 27, at 585-86.
199. 3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1771-74: Vernava, supra note 3, at 324; False &
Misleading, supra note 124, at 172-73.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976); see Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1299-
301 (2d Cir. 1973); False & Misleading, supra note 124, at 171; Private Actions,
supra note 24, at 337. No punitive damages may be awarded. Meisel v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 216 F. Supp. 469, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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